Coffee Law

Collective information acquisition as the geometry of one convex functional

formal_proofs.md proves conservation, synergy and growth. This document shows they are three readings of a single object: the negative-entropy potential on the belief simplex, its Bregman divergence, and the two flows it induces (Bayesian evidence and consensus averaging).

Throughout, Θ is the task-relevant truth on a finite alphabet 𝒳 = {θ_1,…,θ_K} with prior p(θ). D₀ is everything jointly available to the whole system at t=0: every agent’s private context, the initial board G₀, and the frozen weights, which carry information about the world only across possible worlds (Proposition 18). ξ denotes exogenous randomness (sampling noise, scheduling, board rules), independent of (Θ, D₀). Logs are base 2 and information is in bits unless written ln.

Statements marked Lemma or Theorem are proved. Statements marked Model are modeling assumptions, not theorems.


Theorems 1–3 in brief

Proofs are in formal_proofs.md; here we only fix notation.

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The functional

Let Δ = { b ∈ ℝ^K_{≥0} : Σ_k b_k = 1 } be the belief simplex. Define the negative-entropy potential

    F(b) = Σ_k b_k log b_k = −H(b),     strictly convex on Δ.

In bits, ∇F(b)_k = log b_k + 1/ln 2, and on the tangent space {δ : Σ_k δ_k = 0} the Hessian is ∇²F(b) = (1/ln 2) · diag(1/b_k) ≻ 0. (In nats the familiar forms ln b_k + 1 and diag(1/b_k) hold; the factor 1/ln 2 is only the change of units.)


G1. KL is the Bregman divergence of F; mutual information is its mean

Lemma G1. The Bregman divergence of F, D_F(p, q) = F(p) − F(q) − ⟨∇F(q), p − q⟩, equals KL(p ‖ q) (in bits). Proof. ⟨∇F(q), p − q⟩ = Σ_k (log q_k + 1/ln 2)(p_k − q_k) = Σ_k p_k log q_k − Σ_k q_k log q_k, since Σ_k (p_k − q_k) = 0 removes the constant. So D_F(p,q) = Σ p_k log p_k − Σ q_k log q_k − Σ p_k log q_k + Σ q_k log q_k = Σ_k p_k log(p_k/q_k). ∎

Lemma G2. For any signal M, with prior b and posterior b^M = p(·|M),

    I(Θ ; M) = E_M[ KL(b^M ‖ b) ] = E_M[ D_F(b^M, b) ] = H(b) − E_M[ H(b^M) ].

Proof. I(Θ;M) = Σ_{θ,m} p(θ,m) log[p(θ|m)/p(θ)] = Σ_m p(m) KL(b^m ‖ b); the middle equality is Lemma G1; the last is I(Θ;M) = H(Θ) − H(Θ|M). ∎

So every information quantity in Theorems 1–3 is an expected Bregman divergence of F = −H: information gain is expected statistical distance travelled from the prior. In this language, synergy is the failure of submodularity of S ↦ E[D_F(b^S, b)].


G2. Value of information and information gain are the same Jensen gap

Let V(b) = max_a Σ_θ b(θ) u(a,θ). It is convex (a maximum of linear functions), and Bayesian posteriors are a martingale, E_M[b^M] = b, so Jensen gives VoI(M) = E_M[V(b^M)] − V(b) ≥ 0 (formal_proofs.md, Lemmas 6.1–6.2), with equality iff an action optimal at the prior stays optimal at almost every posterior.

Lemma G3 (information gain is the value of information under log loss). Take actions q ∈ Δ (report a distribution) and utility u(q,θ) = log q(θ). Then V(b) = max_q Σ_θ b(θ) log q(θ) = −H(b), and VoI(M) = I(Θ ; M). Proof. Σ_θ b(θ) log q(θ) = −H(b) − KL(b ‖ q) ≤ −H(b), with equality at q = b (Gibbs), so V = −H = F. Then VoI(M) = E_M[−H(b^M)] + H(b) = I(Θ;M) by Lemma G2. ∎

So “uncertainty goes down” (I ≥ 0) and “payoff goes up” (VoI ≥ 0) are one theorem: Jensen’s inequality for a convex value function along a martingale. Information gain is the special case where the decision is “report a belief” and the payoff is log loss.


G3. The Fisher–Rao metric: small information gain is squared length

F’s Hessian is the Fisher information metric of the categorical family. For a tangent perturbation δ (Σ_k δ_k = 0), second-order Taylor expansion of Lemma G1 gives, in bits,

    KL(b + δ ‖ b) = (1 / (2 ln 2)) · Σ_k δ_k² / b_k  +  O(‖δ‖³).

(In nats the constant is ½.) A small information gain is therefore a squared Fisher–Rao length, and a belief trajectory b₀ → b₁ → … → b_T is a path on this Riemannian manifold.

(Δ, F) is dually flat (Amari–Nagaoka) with two affine coordinate systems:


G4. Two flows on the simplex

A real collective does not apply the exact Bayesian map. Model: its belief dynamics combine two flows.

Flow Coordinates in which it is affine Effect
Evidence (Bayes, Theorem 3) e-coordinates (translation by log-likelihood) moves toward the true vertex in expectation (Lemma G4)
Consensus bᵢ ← Σⱼ Wᵢⱼ bⱼ (linear pooling, row-stochastic W) m-coordinates (convex combination) contracts beliefs toward each other (Lemma G5)

Linear pooling is not Bayesian: pooling agents who saw overlapping evidence neither double-counts nor combines their likelihoods; it averages beliefs.

Use the log-loss of the truth as a Lyapunov function. Fix the true value θ* and let

    L(b) = −log b(θ*) = KL(e_{θ*} ‖ b).

Lemma G4 (evidence drift). If observations are drawn from the true likelihood, o ∼ p(· | θ*, a), and the agent updates by Bayes’ rule, then

    E_o[ L(b) − L(b⁺) ] = KL( p(· | θ*, a) ‖ p_b(· | a) ) ≥ 0,

where p_b(o|a) = Σ_θ b(θ) p(o|θ,a) is the agent’s predictive distribution. The decrease is strictly positive iff that predictive differs from the true likelihood. Proof. b⁺(θ*) = b(θ*) p(o|θ*,a) / p_b(o|a), so L(b) − L(b⁺) = log[ p(o|θ*,a) / p_b(o|a) ]. Take the expectation under o ∼ p(·|θ*,a); nonnegativity and the equality case are Gibbs. ∎

So with a correctly specified likelihood, evidence lowers the log-loss of the truth in expectation every round. (Almost-sure convergence b_t(θ*) → 1 additionally needs identifiability; this is Doob’s consistency theorem.)

Lemma G5 (consensus). For agent i after one pooling step b'_i = Σⱼ Wᵢⱼ bⱼ:

  1. L(b'_i) ≤ Σⱼ Wᵢⱼ L(bⱼ) — the pooled log-loss is at most the weighted average of the neighbours’ log-losses (convexity of −log);
  2. H(b'_i) ≥ Σⱼ Wᵢⱼ H(bⱼ) — the pooled belief is at least as uncertain as the neighbours’ average uncertainty (concavity of H); it need not be more uncertain than every neighbour;
  3. L(b'_i) can be larger than L(b_i): pooling hurts an agent whose neighbours are further from the truth than it is.

Proof. (1) and (2) are Jensen. (3) by example: b_1 = (0.9, 0.1), b_2 = (0.1, 0.9), θ* = θ_1, W_{1·} = (½, ½) gives b'_1 = (0.5, 0.5) and L rises from 0.152 to 1 bit. ∎

Regimes (model, not theorem). One round’s change in L for an agent is the sum of an evidence term, which is ≤ 0 in expectation (Lemma G4), and a consensus term, which can have either sign (Lemma G5(3)). The geometry says the collective converges to the truth when the evidence flow dominates and the consensus flow averages toward agents closer to θ*; it can lock onto a wrong vertex when consensus repeatedly pulls toward confident wrong agents. Which regime occurs depends on W, the environment and the policy. No universal threshold follows from these lemmas.

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Tools (the external channel), placed in the geometry

Split each action into a board post and a tool query, A_t^i = (M_t^i, Q_t^i). With world state E_t and D_t = (G_t, E_t, X_t^{1:N}):

    (M_t^i, Q_t^i) ∼ π(· | X_t^i, G_t, O_t^i)
    G_{t+1}        = F_φ(G_t, M_t^{1:N})
    O_{t+1}        ∼ K(· | E_t, Θ, Q_t^{1:N})      # measurement: depends on Θ
    E_{t+1}        ∼ T(· | E_t, Q_t^{1:N})          # intervention: changes the world

Theorem 4 (tools carry the only new information). If Q_t = g(D_t, ξ) with ξ ⟂ (Θ, D_t), then I(Θ ; Q_t | D_t) = 0 and I(Θ ; D_{t+1}) − I(Θ ; D_t) = I(Θ ; O_{t+1} | D_t, Q_t) (formal_proofs.md, Theorem 4). By Lemma G2 this is the only term that adds expected Bregman distance E[D_F(b⁺, b)] about Θ; Theorem 7 caps it per round by the tool’s channel capacity.

Theorem 5 (the board’s routing value is a value of information). With pooled state, the group can pick the query with the highest information yield for the actual state of the world; an isolated agent must pick blind. The difference is the value of information of the pooled signal in the decision problem “which query to run,” with utility equal to information yield (formal_proofs.md, Theorem 5). In the minimal witness — agent 1 knows which query is informative (K), agent 2 owns the tool — the gain is ½ bit, and it is not information about V created by talking but the value of knowing which experiment to run. In geometric terms, pooling lets the group choose the query whose expected Bregman step E[D_F(b⁺, b)] is largest.


Beyond the manifold: access control and the disclosure edge

Two parts of the tool loop sit outside this information geometry:

Theorems 1–8 describe what the collective can know and use; S_t and the disclosure edge describe what it is permitted to do with a channel.

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What this unifies

One potential F = −H and the martingale property of Bayesian posteriors give:

  1. Conservation: post-processing cannot raise E[D_F(b⁺, b)] above the information already in D₀ (DPI).
  2. Synergy: S ↦ E[D_F(b^S, b)] can fail to be submodular.
  3. Growth: only a channel that samples from the true θ adds Bregman distance (Theorems 3, 4), and Theorem 7 caps how much.
  4. Value of information: VoI is the Jensen gap of a convex V; information gain is the log-loss case (Lemma G3).
  5. Regret: decision regret is controlled by belief distance — first-order in total variation, hence by sqrt(KL) through Pinsker (llm_specialization.md, Lemma B0), and locally by the Fisher metric (G3).

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What is NOT proven (honest limits)

Exact numerical checks of Lemmas G1–G5 and the G3 constant are in verify_geometry.py.