Coffee Law

Extensions: completing the theory

Theorems 1–10 establish the Coffee Law, the reasoning ceiling and computational bounds under four assumptions (A1–A4) and a fixed, finite, average-case setting. This document closes the gaps those assumptions leave, one theorem per gap, and states plainly what remains open.

Notation and setup follow Theorem 7: Θ is the truth, D_t the collective’s full record, Q_t = g_t(D_t, ξ_t) the round’s tool calls, O_{t+1} ∼ K_t(· | Θ, Q_t, D_t) the results, S_t = (D_t, ξ_t, Q_t), and C_t the round’s capacity. Logs are base 2. Every finite claim is checked in verify_extensions.py.

Gap Result
The bound is loose for rich tools; when is it reached? Theorem 7′: exact accounting and the equality condition
Reasoning can create channels Theorem 11: compute-gated channels
The law is average-case Theorem 12: worst-case Coffee Law
Agents act, not just know; open-ended tasks Theorem 13: acting is bounded by knowing
Bandwidth between agents Theorem 14: the communication ceiling
The world changes Theorem 15: drift caps knowledge
Adversarial agents Theorem 16: provenance
Continuous quantities Theorem 17: the continuous Coffee Law
What “knowledge in the weights” means Proposition 18: possible worlds
Where to spend: tools or reasoning? Proposition 19: headroom
Capacity is rarely known for a real tool Theorem 20: capacity from the output format
Can any of this be measured? Measuring the quantities
What is still open Open problems

Theorem 7′ — Exact accounting, and when the Coffee Law is tight

Theorem 7′. Under (A1)–(A4):

(a) Exact accounting.

    I(Θ ; D_T)  =  I(Θ ; D₀)  +  Σ_{t<T}  E_s[ I(Θ ; O_{t+1} | S_t = s) ].

(b) Refined budget. Each term is at most the capacity of the channel actually used, and every capacity is at most min(log |𝒪_t|, log |supp Θ|):

    I(Θ ; D_T)  ≤  I(Θ ; D₀)  +  Σ_{t<T}  E[ Cap(K_{t, Q_t, D_t}) ]  ≤  I(Θ ; D₀) + Σ_t C_t.

(c) Equality condition. I(Θ ; D_T) = I(Θ ; D₀) + Σ_t C_t holds iff, for every round and almost every s, the posterior p(· | s) is a capacity-achieving input for the channel K_{t,q,d} chosen at s, and that channel’s capacity equals C_t.

Proof. (a) is the chain-rule decomposition in the proof of Theorem 7, where the noise and query terms are exactly zero. (b) Each conditional term is the mutual information of the chosen channel under input law p(·|s), so at most that channel’s capacity; I(Θ;O) ≤ min(H(O), H(Θ)) ≤ min(log|𝒪|, log|supp Θ|). (c) The bound in Theorem 7 is the sum of the inequalities I(Θ;O|S=s) ≤ Cap(K_{t,q,d}) ≤ C_t; the sum is tight iff each is tight almost surely. ∎

What this fixes. A tool that returns rich output (a web page) does not have “astronomical” capacity about Θ: capacity is also capped by log |supp Θ|, so one rich call can at most reveal Θ completely. When tools are rich, the binding quantity is the realized gain in (a), which can be estimated per call, rather than the worst-case capacity. The capacity form bites hardest for low-capacity tools: tests, yes/no checks, sensors, short API answers. The worked example in verify.py (Scenario 7) shows both cases of (c): querying the other bit keeps the queried bit’s posterior uniform, which is capacity-achieving for a binary symmetric channel, so equality holds; re-querying a bit already observed does not.

Example (software debugging). A test run returns pass or fail, so it is a channel with capacity at most 1 bit. If the bad commit is equally likely to be any of n, identifying it with error at most ε needs at least (1 − ε) log₂ n − 1 test runs by Corollary 7.1, whatever agents run the search; near-certain identification needs about log₂ n. Binary search (git bisect) uses ⌈log₂ n⌉ and is error-free, so it is essentially optimal. With a flaky test that misreports with probability p, each run carries at most 1 − h(p) bits, so the minimum grows by the factor 1 / (1 − h(p)).


Theorem 11 — Reasoning can open channels (compute-gated channels)

Theorems 7–10 treat the set of tools as fixed. In practice, issuing a query can first require finding it: an endpoint, a credential, a cached answer, an exploit. That is computation, and it can raise the information budget.

Setup. Let A_S(d) be the set of queries a collective can issue from record d using total compute at most S, and suppose Q_t ∈ A_S(D_t) almost surely.

Theorem 11.

(a) Compute-dependent budget.

    I(Θ ; D_T)  ≤  I(Θ ; D₀)  +  Σ_{t<T}  sup_{d, q ∈ A_S(d)} Cap(K_{t,q,d})  =:  B_T(S),

and B_T(S) is nondecreasing in S.

(b) Reasoning can raise available information. There are settings in which available information grows with compute. Let Θ be uniform on 4 values, let a tool reveal Θ only after the correct k-bit password is entered, and let the password W be uniform and independent of Θ. A collective that tries S passwords has

    I(Θ ; record)  =  min(1, S / 2^k) · H(Θ),

and no strategy does better.

Proof. (a) Theorem 7′(b) with each capacity taken over the queries that can actually be issued. Larger S enlarges A_S, so the supremum cannot decrease. (b) Each try reveals only whether that guess is right, which is independent of Θ. Let U be the event that some try succeeds; U is independent of Θ. Given U, the record contains Θ; given not U, the record is independent of Θ. So I(Θ ; record) = P(U) · H(Θ). Each try eliminates at most one of the 2^k equally likely passwords, so P(U) ≤ S / 2^k, with equality for any sequence of distinct guesses. ∎

Corollary 11.1 (what a sandbox is). A sandbox is a guarantee that, for every compute level S an agent can actually use, A_S(d) ⊆ A_allowed for all d. Under that guarantee the budget is at most I(Θ ; D₀) + Σ_t sup_{q ∈ A_allowed} Cap(K_{t,q,d}), no matter how capable the agents are. An escape is exactly a feasible S with A_S ⊄ A_allowed. ∎

The refined claim. The earlier statement “reasoning raises usable information, never available information” holds for a fixed set of reachable channels. Reasoning that discovers new channels raises available information, up to B_T(S). In OpenAI’s reported 2026 incidents, models under evaluation escaped their test sandbox and retrieved benchmark answers from an outside server. That is this theorem in practice: the answers were not in the sandbox, so the only route to them was a channel the designers had not allowed.


Theorem 12 — The worst-case Coffee Law (no prior needed)

The Coffee Law is stated for a random Θ with a prior. Theorem 12 removes the prior: it applies to any finite set of possible truths and says there is a specific truth on which the collective errs.

Setup. Let {θ₁, …, θ_M} (M ≥ 3) be possible truths, with no prior. The starting data is drawn as D₀ ∼ K₀(· | θ), a channel with capacity C₀ (C₀ = 0 if the starting data does not depend on which truth holds). Tools satisfy (A2)–(A4) for every θ_i.

Theorem 12. For every collective strategy and estimator Θ̂,

    max_i  P_{θ_i}( Θ̂ ≠ θ_i )  ≥  ( log M − min(log M, C₀ + Σ_{t<T} C_t) − 1 ) / log(M − 1).

Proof. Put the uniform prior on {θ_i}. The maximum error over i is at least the average error, which is the error under that prior. Under it, H(Θ) = log M, I(Θ ; D₀) ≤ C₀, and Theorem 7 bounds I(Θ ; D_T) by min(log M, C₀ + Σ_t C_t). Fano’s inequality finishes. ∎

Reading. For any family of M tasks the collective cannot distinguish beyond its budget, there is a particular task on which it is wrong at least this often. This is Fano’s method, standard for minimax lower bounds, applied to agent collectives. Checked on 300 random channels.


Theorem 13 — Acting is bounded by knowing

Assumption (A4) excludes outcomes the agents control. Most agentic tasks are about acting: fixing code, operating systems, maximizing a reward. Theorem 13 covers acting in a fixed but unknown environment.

Setup. The environment W is fixed and unknown, and the agents’ actions do not change it (A4 for W). There are M ≥ 3 actions. The best action A* = a*(W) is unique, with a gap Δ > 0: u(a*(W), W) − u(a, W) ≥ Δ for every a ≠ a*(W). Actions may themselves be tool calls whose outcomes satisfy (A2)–(A3) with W as the truth. A_t is the action at round t.

Theorem 13. At every round t,

    E[ regret_t ]  ≥  Δ · P(A_t ≠ A*)
                   ≥  Δ · ( H(A*) − min(H(A*), I(W ; D₀) + Σ_{s<t} C_s) − 1 ) / log(M − 1),

and cumulative regret is at least the sum of these floors.

Proof. The first inequality is the gap condition. A_t is a function of D_t and independent noise, so it is an estimator of A*. A* is a function of W, so I(A* ; D_t) ≤ I(W ; D_t), which Theorem 7 bounds by I(W ; D₀) + Σ_{s<t} C_s; also I(A* ; D_t) ≤ H(A*). Fano’s inequality applied to A* gives the floor. ∎

Open-ended tasks. Writing code or a document has no single right answer, but it has a hidden specification — what the user actually wants. Take W to be that specification and the output to be the action. Whenever outputs that miss the specification lose at least Δ in quality, Theorem 13 bounds performance by information about the specification: an agent cannot reliably build what it has not learned the user wants.

Imperfect agents. For LLM agents this lower bound pairs with the upper bound of Theorem B4: regret is at least the information floor here, and at most the sum of information shortfall, channel loss, miscalibration and decision error there.

Checked on a 4-armed bandit with a greedy policy: per-round regret stays above the floor in every round.


Theorem 14 — The communication ceiling

Theorem 9 counts compute but treats the board as free. Real agents have limited context and message length. When data is split across agents, what any single agent can learn is limited by what reaches it.

Theorem 14.

(a) Bandwidth bound. Let agent 1 hold D¹, and let the transcript Π of all messages reaching agent 1 take at most 2^L values (L bits). Then, for anything agent 1 outputs,

    I(Θ ; D¹, Π)  ≤  I(Θ ; D¹)  +  L.

(b) Some functions need many bits. Let agents 1 and 2 hold independent uniform x, y ∈ {0,1}ⁿ, and let Θ = ⟨x, y⟩ mod 2. Then I(Θ ; x) = I(Θ ; y) = 0 and I(Θ ; x, y) = H(Θ): together they know Θ. Yet for any protocol, with any number of rounds and any computation, in which at most L bits are exchanged,

    I(Θ ; x, Π)  ≤  log₂(1 + 2^{L + 1 − n/2}).

So agent 1 learns essentially nothing until about n/2 bits have been exchanged.

Proof. (a) Chain rule: I(Θ ; D¹, Π) = I(Θ ; D¹) + I(Θ ; Π | D¹) and I(Θ ; Π | D¹) ≤ H(Π) ≤ L. (b) Append agent 1’s output to the transcript, giving a protocol of L + 1 bits whose last bit is the output. By Lindsey’s lemma, the inner-product function has discrepancy at most 2^{−n/2} under the uniform distribution, so any c-bit protocol has advantage at most 2^c · 2^{−n/2}: it is correct with probability at most ½ + 2^{L − n/2}. This holds for randomized protocols too, by averaging. Sampling a guess from agent 1’s exact posterior is such a protocol, so by Lemma 10.1, H(Θ | x, Π) ≥ −log(½ + 2^{L−n/2}). With H(Θ) ≤ 1, this gives the bound. ∎

Reading. This is a third ceiling, distinct from information and compute: the collective as a whole holds the answer, but no member can learn it without enough communication. Parity splits cheaply (one bit per agent; see Theorem 10); inner product needs about n/2 bits. Unlike Theorem 10(b), this bound holds even with unlimited computation.

Checked: Lindsey’s lemma on all 256 × 256 rectangle pairs for n = 3, and optimized one-way protocols for n = 6, L = 1 stay below the bound. The inner-product lower bound is due to Chor and Goldreich (SIAM J. Computing, 1988); see Kushilevitz and Nisan, Communication Complexity (1997).


Theorem 15 — In a changing world, knowledge saturates

Assumption (A4) also fixes Θ in time. Here the truth drifts.

Setup. The truth is a Markov chain Θ₀, Θ₁, … with transition kernel P, unaffected by the agents. In round t the tools observe the current state Θ_t, satisfying (A2)–(A3) with Θ_t as the truth; then Θ_{t+1} is drawn from P(· | Θ_t). Let η = η_KL(P) ≤ 1 be the strong data-processing constant of P: the smallest η with I(U ; Y) ≤ η · I(U ; X) whenever U — X — Y and Y ∼ P(· | X).

Theorem 15. Let x_t = I(Θ_t ; D_t) be what the record knows about the current state. Then

    x_{t+1}  ≤  η · (x_t + C_t),

so with C_t ≤ C,

    x_t  ≤  η^t x₀  +  η C / (1 − η)        (if η < 1).

Proof. One round of tool use adds at most C_t about the current state, by the argument of Theorem 7 with Θ_t as the truth: I(Θ_t ; D_{t+1}) ≤ x_t + C_t. Because the drift ignores the agents, D_{t+1} — Θ_t — Θ_{t+1} is a Markov chain, so the strong data-processing inequality gives I(Θ_{t+1} ; D_{t+1}) ≤ η · I(Θ_t ; D_{t+1}). Unroll the recursion. ∎

Reading. In a changing world, knowledge does not accumulate forever. It saturates near ηC / (1 − η), however long the agents run: drift erases old knowledge, and tools must keep refreshing it. For a bit that flips with probability ρ each round, η = (1 − 2ρ)². Checked exactly for ρ = p = 0.1: the record’s knowledge levels off near 0.384 bits by round 9, under the cap of 0.944. (Strong data-processing inequalities: Ahlswede and Gács, Annals of Probability, 1976.)


Theorem 16 — Adversaries, and why provenance matters

Setup. An adversarial agent posts messages M chosen by any strategy. The record keeps provenance if each post is stored with its author.

Theorem 16.

(a) With provenance, adversaries cannot remove information. For any adversarial posts, I(Θ ; D, M) ≥ I(Θ ; D). For usable information, I_V(D, M → Θ) ≥ I_V(D → Θ) whenever V can ignore a named author’s posts.

(b) Adversaries without the truth cannot add information. If the adversary’s posts are functions of D₀ and truth-independent noise, they add no available information (Theorem 1). An adversary with access to Θ is a side channel, assumption (A1).

(c) Without provenance, one adversary can erase everything. If an honest agent posts Θ (a fair bit) and an adversary posts 1 − Θ, an unattributed record (the multiset of posts) carries zero bits about Θ, while the attributed record carries 1 bit.

Proof. (a) Chain rule: I(Θ ; D, M) = I(Θ ; D) + I(Θ ; M | D) ≥ I(Θ ; D). If V contains, for each predictor, the version that ignores the adversary’s posts, its best loss on (D, M) is no worse than on D. (b) is Theorem 1. (c) The multiset is always {0, 1}, whatever Θ is. ∎

Reading. Adversaries cannot destroy information, only hide it, and they hide it by breaking provenance. The design rule is to authenticate and attribute every message. With provenance, the remaining damage is to decisions: persuasion of imperfect agents (B3) and flooding the context of agents that cannot ignore posts. Checked: all 16 adversary strategies against an attributed record, and the erasure witness.


Theorem 17 — The continuous Coffee Law

Setup. Θ is real-valued with finite differential entropy h(Θ). Mutual information is defined in general (Cover & Thomas, ch. 8), and capacities are taken under each tool’s input constraints. For example, a tool returning Θ + N(0, σ²) has capacity ½ log(1 + P/σ²) per call under the constraint E[Θ²] ≤ P.

Theorem 17. The budget of Theorem 7 holds verbatim, I(Θ ; D_T) ≤ I(Θ ; D₀) + Σ_t C_t, and Fano’s inequality is replaced by its estimation counterpart: for any estimator Θ̂,

    E[(Θ − Θ̂)²]  ≥  (1 / (2πe)) · 2^{2 (h(Θ) − I(Θ ; D₀) − Σ_t C_t)}.

Proof. The chain-rule argument of Theorem 7 uses only properties that hold for general random variables. For the Gaussian tool, a posterior’s second moment P_s averages to at most P, and ½ log(1 + P_s/σ²) is concave in P_s, so Jensen keeps each round’s gain within ½ log(1 + P/σ²). For the estimation bound, h(Θ | Θ̂) ≥ h(Θ) − I(Θ ; D_T) by the data-processing inequality, and a variable with second moment v has differential entropy at most ½ log(2πe v) (Cover & Thomas, Theorem 8.6.6). ∎

Reading. For quantities rather than categories, information buys squared error at the exchange rate of a factor of 4 per bit. Checked for a Gaussian truth observed through Gaussian noise, where the bound holds with equality.


Proposition 18 — What a model’s weights know: possible worlds

The theory counts a pretrained model’s weights as part of the starting data D₀. Read literally, that is a puzzle. A trained model’s weights are fixed numbers, so over a distribution of questions they carry zero mutual information about anything; and for a factual question (“capital of France?”) the question alone determines the answer, so all the information is already “available”. Mutual information needs something random, and for facts about the world the right random object is the world itself.

Setup. Let W be the state of the world, with a prior over the ways things could have been. A question X is drawn independently of W, and its answer is Θ = θ(W, X). Training is a channel from the world to the weights: a corpus is drawn from P(· | W) and the weights M are computed from it, so W — corpus — M, and M is independent of X.

Proposition 18.

(a) Over possible worlds, weights carry information bounded by the training data.

    I(Θ ; X, M)  ≤  I(Θ ; X)  +  I(W ; M)    and    I(W ; M)  ≤  I(W ; corpus).

So the Coffee Law applies with D₀ = (X, M), and what a model can know about the world is bounded by what its training data carried.

(b) In one fixed world, knowledge is usable information. If W is fixed, then M is constant, Θ is a function of X, and I(Θ ; X, M) = I(Θ ; X) = H(Θ). Everything is available; the model’s knowledge shows up only as usable information I_V(X, M → Θ) (Theorem 8): its ability to compute the answer from the question.

Proof. (a) Chain rule: I(Θ ; X, M) = I(Θ ; X) + I(Θ ; M | X). Given X, Θ is a function of W, so I(Θ ; M | X) ≤ I(W ; M | X) by the data-processing inequality, and I(W ; M | X) = I(W ; M) because X is independent of (W, M). The second inequality is the data-processing inequality for W — corpus — M. (b) With W fixed, M is constant and Θ = θ(w, X). ∎

Reading. When a model “knows” a fact, two statements are true at once. Across possible worlds, its weights carry information about which world this is, at most what its training data carried. Within the actual world, that information shows up as the model’s ability to compute answers from questions, which is usable information, not available information. This is why debate can improve factuality (Theorem 8): within the actual world, the facts are usable-information problems. It is also why a model cannot know facts its training data never carried. Checked on a two-fact world in which training reveals one fact: the weights add exactly the information about the revealed fact, and in a fixed world they add nothing.


Proposition 19 — Where to spend: headroom on each lever

The ceilings say how much each kind of spending can possibly buy.

Proposition 19. Let D_T be the current record and V the agents’ current predictive family.

(a) Reasoning headroom. More reasoning on the same record (any larger family V′ ⊇ V) raises usable information by at most the reasoning gap:

    I_{V′}(D_T → Θ) − I_V(D_T → Θ)  ≤  I(Θ ; D_T) − I_V(D_T → Θ).

(b) Information headroom. T′ more tool rounds raise available information by at most

    min( Σ_{t=T}^{T+T′−1} C_t ,  H(Θ) − I(Θ ; D_T) ).

(c) Both together raise usable information by at most the reasoning gap plus Σ_t C_t over the new rounds.

Proof. (a) I_{V′}(D_T → Θ) ≤ I(Θ ; D_T) by Theorem 8(a). (b) Exact accounting (Theorem 7′) bounds each new round by its capacity, and I(Θ ; D) ≤ H(Θ). (c) I_{V′}(D_{T+T′} → Θ) ≤ I(Θ ; D_{T+T′}) ≤ I(Θ ; D_T) + Σ C_t; subtract I_V(D_T → Θ). ∎

A spending rule. Each lever’s possible return is capped by its headroom. Invest in the lever whose headroom per unit cost is larger, and stop investing in a lever whose headroom is used up. In the noisy example of Theorem 7, after two calls the reasoning gap for a one-look agent is 0.80 bits and the information headroom is 0.94 bits, so both levers are open; with a noise-free tool after two calls, information headroom is zero and only reasoning can help.


Theorem 20 — Tool capacity from the output format

Theorem 7 charges each round its Shannon capacity C_t, a maximum over input laws that is rarely known for a real tool. This theorem replaces it with a number read off the tool’s interface: the size of the set of results the call can return. No model of the tool is needed.

Setup. The observable result O of a call is everything the call writes into the record: the payload, the status or error code, any truncation flag, and the latency or any other side effect the agents can read. 𝒪 is the set of possible observable results. If the harness passes only f(O) into the record (for example output cut to N tokens), the observable result is f(O).

Theorem 20. Under (A1)–(A4):

(a) Entropy bound. For every query q, history d and input law,

    I(Θ ; O | S_t = s)  ≤  H(O | S_t = s)  ≤  log₂ |𝒪|,

so Cap(K_{t,q,d}) ≤ log₂ |𝒪|. With a noise floor, Cap(K_{t,q,d}) ≤ log₂ |𝒪| − min_θ H(K_{t,q,d}(· | θ)).

(b) Several calls. If round t makes k calls with result sets 𝒪¹, …, 𝒪ᵏ, then C_t ≤ Σ_j log₂ |𝒪ʲ|. The results may be correlated; no independence is needed.

(c) Budget from interfaces. Summing over rounds,

    I(Θ ; D_T)  ≤  min( H(Θ),  I(Θ ; D₀) + Σ_{calls} log₂ |𝒪_call| ).

(d) Counting 𝒪. For common formats, exactly:

Result format \|𝒪\| log₂ \|𝒪\|
boolean (pass/fail) 2 1
one of k values (enum, label, status code) k log₂ k
integer in [a, b] b − a + 1 log₂(b − a + 1)
exactly L bytes 256^L 8L
at most L bytes (256^{L+1} − 1)/255 < 8L + 0.0057
at most L tokens, vocabulary V Σ_{ℓ=0}^{L} V^ℓ < L log₂ V + log₂(V/(V−1))
record {f₁: T₁, …, f_m: T_m} Π_i \|T_i\| Σ_i log₂ \|T_i\|
one of several shapes T₁ \| … \| T_m (incl. errors) Σ_i \|T_i\| ≤ max_i log₂ \|T_i\| + log₂ m
optional T \|T\| + 1 ≤ log₂ \|T\| + 1
list of at most n items of T Σ_{i=0}^{n} \|T\|^i  
ranked top k of N items N!/(N−k)! < k log₂ N
set of k of N items C(N, k)  
latency read at resolution δ up to timeout τ multiply by ⌊τ/δ⌋ + 1 add log₂(⌊τ/δ⌋ + 1)

Proof. (a) Fix s = (d, x, q). I(Θ;O|S=s) = H(O|S=s) − H(O|Θ,S=s), and H(O|Θ,S=s) ≥ 0, so I ≤ H(O|S=s) ≤ log₂|𝒪| (entropy is maximized by the uniform law, by Gibbs’ inequality, Lemma 1.1). For the noise floor, H(O|Θ,S=s) = Σ_θ p(θ|s) H(K(·|θ)) ≥ min_θ H(K(·|θ)). Taking the maximum over input laws gives the capacity bounds. (b) Apply (a) to the joint result (O¹, …, Oᵏ), whose set has Π_j |𝒪ʲ| elements. (c) Put (b) into step 3 of the proof of Theorem 7. (d) Counting: products for records, disjoint unions for alternatives, and geometric sums for variable-length strings and lists, e.g. Σ_{ℓ≤L} 256^ℓ = (256^{L+1} − 1)/255 < 256^L · 256/255. ∎

Machine checks. The two information-theoretic steps, I(W; O) ≤ log |𝒪| and I(W; D, O) ≤ I(W; D) + log |𝒪| (one round of (c)), are proved in Lean 4 (lean/CoffeeLaw/Information.lean, mutualInfo_le_log_card and mutualInfo_append_le). The counts in (d), the bounds in (a)–(b) on random channels (Blahut–Arimoto), and the examples below are checked in verify_capacity.py.

What it gives for real tools.

Tool log₂ \|𝒪\| (bits per call)
unit test, pass/fail 1
test runner, pass/fail + exit code 9
HTTP status code only 8.97
sensor, 12-bit ADC 12
weather API {status: 3 values, temp_c: −90..60, conditions: 12 values, alerts: ≤3 of 20} 25.45
classifier, 1000 labels or one of 8 error codes 9.98
retrieval, ranked top 10 of 10⁶ documents 199.3
text reply of at most 280 bytes 2240.0
LLM tool reply of at most 2000 tokens, V = 100,277 33,227

Reading the table.


Measuring the quantities

The bounds are only as useful as the quantities in them can be estimated.


What remains open

Scope note. None of the proofs inspect the agents, so every result applies unchanged to people, programs and mixed human–AI teams.

These gaps are not closed here, and some cannot be closed with current mathematics:

  1. Compute for typical tasks. Theorem 10 covers the extremes (parity, cryptography). A general formula for the compute a task needs would settle open problems such as P vs NP. Bounds for specific task families, such as multi-step reasoning chains or search, are open.
  2. Reaching the budget in general. Theorem 7′(c) says exactly when the bound is tight, but gives no algorithm that finds a capacity-achieving query strategy for arbitrary tools.
  3. Outcomes the agents control. Theorem 13 covers acting in a fixed environment. When the agents’ actions change the environment itself (self-fulfilling predictions, systems they modify), a different theory is needed.
  4. Lower bounds for LLM-specific losses. Part B bounds the cost of miscalibration and persuasion from above. Showing that a given model must incur such losses requires measurement, not proof.
  5. Measuring the inputs. I(W ; M) for a pretrained model (Proposition 18) is well defined but hard to estimate. For tools, Theorem 20 gives an upper bound on C_t read off the interface, but for rich formats it is loose and the realized gain must be estimated.
  6. Trading one ceiling for another. The information, compute and communication ceilings each hold, so their minimum does too. Results on trading them — spending compute to save communication, or tool calls to save reasoning — are open, and they are the practically important question.
  7. Agents that learn across episodes. An agent fine-tuned on its own tool results changes its starting data over time. A continual-learning version of the law, which tracks how much each episode’s results can add to the weights, is not given here.
  8. Formal verification. The Markov condition W — (D₀, 𝒯) — A for any collective, the data-processing inequality and the output-entropy bounds are proved in Lean 4 (Machine-checked core). The capacity form of the law, Fano’s inequality and the other theorems are checked numerically on finite examples only.
  9. Incentives. The theory says what agents can learn and do, not what they will try to do. Reward hacking, persistence on impossible tasks and agents adopting one another’s goals concern objectives; modeling them needs game theory or alignment theory on top of these bounds. Theorem 16 covers adversaries only in a narrow sense.